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Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is It
Possible?
J.B. Ruhl∗
INTRODUCTION
The history of environmental law provides as good of an
example as any other field in regulatory law of how successful
prescriptive regulation has been at meeting public policy
objectives and how difficult it will be to extend that experience
much further into the future. For decades so-called “commandand-control” regulation has picked the low-hanging fruit—in
environmental law, for example, it has targeted emissions from
smokestacks and discharge pipes, disposal of wastes in
landfills, transportation of hazardous chemicals, and similar
discrete, easily-identified sources of environmental harm. Even
the most conservative cost-benefit analyses confirm that many
of these initiatives were smashing successes.1 Our nation’s air
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1. For example, in March 2005, the White House’s Office of Management
and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) released the
results of a cost-benefit analysis conducted of federal rules imposed from
1994–2004 by nine federal departments and agencies. OIRA estimates that
the annual compliance costs of the rules are between $34.8 billion and $39.4
billion, that the annual social benefits of the rules are between $68.1 billion
and $259.6 billion, and that most of the costs and benefits are attributable to
several rules the Environmental Protection Agency promulgated to regulate
public exposure to fine particulate matter. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 3, 8 (2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2005_cb/draft_2005_cd_report.pdf. Of
course, it is not necessarily the case that this is the most efficient outcome.
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and water resources are cleaner, and our lands and roads are
safer.
The future that lies ahead for most fields of regulation,
however, is filled with problems of unwieldy dimensions and
intractable causes. In environmental law, for example, the
problems that are foremost to many observers include the
invasion of non-native species into ecosystems, the depletion of
estuarine resources by fertilizer runoff from countless
agricultural operations hundreds to thousands of miles inland,
the degradation of habitat from suburban “sprawl,” and the
evidence of climate change, which itself is irrefutable even if its
In this brand of environmental policy
causes are not.2
challenge, there are no discrete sources or clearly traced lines
of causation. Rather, problems such as these exhibit the
hallmark characteristics of complex adaptive systems.3 Their
behavior emanates from a multitude of diverse, dispersed
sources responding to coevolving interactions, feedback loops,

Cass Sunstein has observed that “the United States spent no less than $632
billion for pollution control between 1972 and 1985, and some studies suggest
that alternative strategies could have achieved the same gains at less than
one-fifth the cost.” Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 407, 411 (1990). Indeed, it is fair to say that by the mid-1990s
“virtually everyone . . . agree[d] that our historical command-and-control
approach [was] inefficient and inadequate by itself to carry us where we still
need to go.” Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Search for Regulatory Alternatives,
15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J., at viii, viii (1996). On the other hand, for the view that
“rigid insistence on making regulations pass cost-benefit tests would, in
retrospect, have gotten the wrong answer time after time,” see Frank
Ackerman, Lisa Heinzerling & Rachel Massey, Applying Cost-Benefit to Past
Decisions: Was Environmental Protection Ever a Good Idea?, 57 ADMIN. L.
REV. 155, 192 (2005).
2. For a survey of these and similar environmental concerns, see JOHN
COPELAND NAGLE & J.B. RUHL, THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT 299-804 (2002). To be sure, it is not as if human societies have
never before confronted such challenges. As Jared Diamond observes in his
sweeping survey of the collapse of human societies, environmental phenomena
such as climate change and invasive species, and social phenomena, such as
urban sprawl and trade, have combined many times in the past to cause
dramatic dislocations of previously successful societies. See JARED DIAMOND,
COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED 6-10 (2005). The
difference today has to do with scale: we have more people, more potent
technology, and fewer resources per capita than did societies of the past, and
global interconnections are tighter and far more expansive, meaning problems
in one region affect potentially many others. See id. at 8.
3. Complex adaptive systems are “macroscopic collections of [interacting]
units that are endowed with the potential to evolve in time.” PETER COVENEY
& ROGER HIGHFIELD, FRONTIERS OF COMPLEXITY: THE SEARCH FOR ORDER IN
A CHAOTIC WORLD 7 (1995).
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and nonlinear cause-and-effect properties.4 They are, to put it
simply, excruciatingly hard for researchers to understand,5 and
4. Although the study of such systems can be quite technical in
substance, many of the recent and most influential works in the field focus on
applications of the technical theory to real world phenomena, such as
biological evolution. See, e.g., JOHN L. CASTI, COMPLEXIFICATION: EXPLAINING
A PARADOXICAL WORLD THROUGH THE SCIENCE OF SURPRISE (1994); JACK
COHEN & IAN STEWART, THE COLLAPSE OF CHAOS: DISCOVERING SIMPLICITY
IN A COMPLEX WORLD (1994); MURRAY GELL-MANN, THE QUARK AND THE
JAGUAR: ADVENTURES IN THE SIMPLE AND THE COMPLEX (1996); BRIAN
GOODWIN, HOW THE LEOPARD CHANGED ITS SPOTS: THE EVOLUTION OF
COMPLEXITY (1996); JOHN H. HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER: HOW ADAPTATION
BUILDS COMPLEXITY (1995); STEVEN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED
LIVES OF ANTS, BRAINS, CITIES, AND SOFTWARE (2001); STUART KAUFFMAN, AT
HOME IN THE UNIVERSE: THE SEARCH FOR LAWS OF SELF-ORGANIZATION AND
COMPLEXITY (1995); RICHARD SOLÉ & BRIAN GOODWIN, SIGNS OF LIFE: HOW
COMPLEXITY PERVADES BIOLOGY (2000). Complexity theory and the science of
complex adaptive systems have radically altered the way in which scientists
study natural systems as mundane as a dripping faucet and as grand as the
weather. See COVENEY & HIGHFIELD, supra note 3, at 5-8. For centuries, the
classical scientific method has approached such behavior in a reductionist
manner, intent on studying components of whole complex systems at their
most irreducible levels. See id. at 11-14. Reductionism is based on the
premise that by understanding how each part works in its simplest form, we
can understand how the whole system works. See id. at 432; see also CASTI,
supra, at 273; COHEN & STEWART, supra, at 33-34. The advent of high-speed
computers that allow system modeling at levels of detail never before
imagined opened the door to the alternative view of systems that complexity
theory posits. See generally JOHN L. CASTI, WOULD-BE WORLDS: HOW
SIMULATION IS CHANGING THE FRONTIERS OF SCIENCE (1997). Although it is
relatively young as a scientific discipline, complexity theory has already
emerged as an important force in virtually every field of the physical sciences
as well as in a wide array of the social sciences. See COVENEY & HIGHFIELD,
supra note 3, at 5-14. For histories of the development of complexity theory,
which has been brought about largely through the efforts of the Santa Fe
Institute, see JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE (1987); ROGER
LEWIN, COMPLEXITY: LIFE AT THE EDGE OF CHAOS (1992); and M. MITCHELL
WALDROP, COMPLEXITY: THE EMERGING SCIENCE AT THE EDGE OF ORDER AND
CHAOS (1992). Current information about the field is best obtained from the
journal Complexity.
5. See Brian Walker et al., Resilience Management in Social-Ecological
Systems: A Working Hypothesis for a Participatory Approach, 6
ECOLOGY
14
(2002),
available
at
CONSERVATION
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol6/iss1/art14/print.pdf. Describing the
complex system attributes of natural resources, the authors conclude that
[t]hese aspects of uncertainty limit the usefulness of forecasting
methods for the scientific study and management of regions in
transition. Given these limits to understanding, we must focus on
learning to live within systems, rather than “control” them. One
might argue that it is impossible to deal with such fundamental limits
of understanding, and our only reasonable choice is to struggle blindly
onward.
Id.

RUHL_FINAL_136.DOC

24

01/09/2006 12:45:08 PM

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 7:1

thus even harder for law to wrestle under control.6
6. Jim Salzman and I recently explored the challenge complex adaptive
systems, including law itself, pose to the development of regulatory policy. See
J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of
Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757 (2003). A
growing body of legal scholarship uses complex adaptive systems theory and
the related discipline of chaos theory to inform the design of a broad array of
legal institutions and policies. See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock et al., Democracy’s
Discontent in a Complex World: Can Avalanches, Sandpiles, and Finches
Optimize Michael Sandel’s Civic Republican Community?, 85 GEO. L.J. 2085
(1997) (critiquing civic republican political theory using complex systems
principles); Vincent Di Lorenzo, Complexity and Legislative Signatures:
Lending Discrimination Laws as a Test Case, 12 J.L. & POL. 637 (1996) (using
chaos theory to evaluate the legislative response to alleged lending
discrimination); Vincent Di Lorenzo, Legislative Chaos: An Exploratory Study,
12 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 425, 432-35 (1994) (developing a model for legislative
decisionmaking based on chaos theory); Gerald Andrews Emison, The
Potential for Unconventional Progress: Complex Adaptive Systems and
Environmental Quality Policy, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 167, 192 (1996)
(applying to ecological protection issues); Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos,
Complexity, and Coevolution: The Web of Law, Management Theory, and Law
Related Services at the Millennium, 65 TENN. L. REV. 925 (1998) (discussing
complexity theory in the context of corporate structure, management, and
law); Thomas Earl Geu, The Tao of Jurisprudence: Chaos, Brain Science,
Synchronicity, and the Law, 61 TENN. L. REV. 933, 934-35 (1994) (discussing
the potential significance of chaos and emergence to legal theory); Andrew W.
Hayes, An Introduction to Chaos and Law, 60 UMKC L. REV. 751, 764-73
(1992) (containing a general discussion of chaos theory and its application to
judicial decisionmaking); Jeff L. Lewin, The Genesis and Evolution of Legal
Uncertainty About “Reasonable Medical Certainty,” 57 U. MD. L. REV. 380,
389-93 (1998) (describing the evolution of the tort doctrine of “reasonable
medical certainty” using complex systems principles); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and
Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 643-65 (1996)
(describing legal evolution according to path dependence theory and chaotic
systems theory); J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the
Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism
and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849 (1996) (using
complexity theory to develop a general behavioral model of the legal system);
J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the
Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49
VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996) (using complexity theory to develop a general
evolutionary model of the legal system); J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The
Arrow of the Law in Complex Administrative States: Using Complexity Theory
to Reveal the Diminishing Returns and Increased Risk the Burgeoning of Law
Poses to Modern Society, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405 (1997) (using complexity
theory to describe the direction in which the behavioral and evolutionary
mechanics are leading the sociolegal system given its current transient state);
Robert E. Scott, Chaos Theory and the Justice Paradox, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 329, 329-31 (1993) (applying chaos theory to the legal dilemma between
“present justice” and “future justice”); Kenton K. Yee, Coevolution of Law and
Culture: A Coevolutionary Games Approach, COMPLEXITY, Jan./Feb. 1997, at 4
(describing attempts to mathematically model evolution of common law
according to complex adaptive systems dynamics). Several other works
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This kind of policy problem thus confounds the prescriptive
regulation model, because there are no readily available targets
for the prescriptions and, even worse, we have no idea what
response the system would exhibit to any particular command.
Even if legislatures armed them with unlimited powers,
administrative agencies could not simply command away
invasive species, or farm runoff, or new rooftops, or global
climate change. There is almost universal agreement that
problems of this sort demand new approaches to regulation.7
Agencies thus have experimented with many alternatives to
prescriptive regulation, including market-based programs,
discuss complexity theory or its branches, such as chaos theory, in specific
legal settings, albeit sometimes very briefly. See Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Capital Market Theory, Mandatory Disclosure, and Price Discovery, 51 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 843, 854-59 (1994) (applying chaos theory to capital market
regulation); Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic
Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546, 581-92 (1994) (discussing the application of chaos
theory to capital market regulation); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of
Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 68, 114-15 (1991) (explaining Supreme Court constitutional
jurisprudence using, among other methods, a discussion of chaos theory);
Alistair M. Hanna, The Land Use System, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 531, 538
(1996) (discussing application of chaos theory and self-organization theory to
land use regulation system); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 110, 112-15 (1991) (explaining Supreme Court constitutional
jurisprudence using chaos theory); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Is Democracy Like
Sex?, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1635, 1639-40 (1995) (discussing the anti-parasitic
effect of evolutionary processes as an analogy to democratic processes);
William H. Rodgers, Jr., Where Environmental Law and Biology Meet: Of
Pandas’ Thumbs, Statutory Sleepers, and Effective Law, 65 U. COLO. L. REV.
25, 46-48 (1993) (discussing chaos theory surfacing in evolutionary biology
commentary as a metaphor for evolution of environmental law); see also Eric
Kades, The Laws of Complexity and the Complexity of Laws: The Implications
of Computational Complexity Theory for the Law, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 403,
452-54, 476 (1997) (focusing on mathematically complex issues as they arise in
law, such as cyclical priority issues in liens and property titles); Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 480-82
(1997) (advocating an empiricist “systems approach” to legal analysis); Randal
C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the
Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225 (1997) (using computational
theories to examine norm competition).
7. This is the principal thrust of some of my prior work in environmental
law—that problems of environmental degradation often behave as complex
adaptive systems, and thus the law must respond in ways that are adaptive as
well. See J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive
System: How to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of
Environmental Law, 34 HOU. L. REV. 933 (1997); see also Alastair Iles,
Adaptive Management: Making Environmental Law and Policy More Dynamic,
Experimentalist, and Learning, 10 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J., 288, 289-90 (1996).
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information-based
programs,
negotiated
project-specific
licensing, ecosystem-scaled land management programs, multiparty collaborative planning efforts, and government-private
quasi-partnerships.8 While there remains much debate over
the effectiveness of this so-called “second generation” of
regulatory instruments,9 many bright spots exist in their
relatively short period of implementation,10 and the momentum
8. For excellent summaries of these alternative regulatory instruments,
see CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP
(2003) (surveying alternative enforcement and compliance methods); Dennis
D. Hirsch, Lean and Green? Environmental Law and Policy for the Flexible
Production Economy, 79 IND. L.J. 611 (2004); Dennis D. Hirsch, Second
Generation Policy and the New Economy, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (2001); Richard
B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 437 (2003); and Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental
Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21 (2001).
9. See, e.g., Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is Commandand-Control Efficient?
Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative
Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection,
1999 WIS. L. REV. 887; Rena I. Steinzor, Regulatory Reinvention and Project
XL: Does the Emperor Have Any Clothes?, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.)
10,527, 10,527-28 (1996).
10. The Clean Air Act sulfur dioxide emissions trading program for
electric utilities, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 401, 104 Stat. 2399, 2584 (1990), is
widely regarded as the most successful example of integration of market
efficiencies into the command-and-control regulatory structure. See, e.g.,
Dallas Burtraw & Byron Swift, A New Standard of Performance: An Analysis
of the Clean Air Act’s Acid Rain Program, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.)
10,411 (1996); Utilities Achieve 100 Percent Compliance with EPA Acid Rain
Program, Report Says, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 885 (Aug. 16, 1996); Timothy A.
Wilkins & Terrell E. Hunt, Agency Discretion and Advances in Regulatory
Theory: Flexible Agency Approaches Toward the Regulated Community as a
Model for the Congress-Agency Relationship, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 479, 491
(1995). For an example of the success of information-based approaches to
environmental regulation, companies subject to the toxic release inventory
(TRI) reporting provisions of the Emergency Planning and Community Rightto Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11023, reported the total release of 10.4 billion
pounds of specified toxic chemicals into the environment in 1987, including 3.9
billion to landfills, 3.3 billion to other treatment and disposal facilities, 2.7
billion into the ambient air, and 550 million to surface waters. By 1995 the
total reported had fallen to 2.6 billion pounds, and by 1997 it had fallen to 2.57
billion. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 377-78 (3d ed. 2000). Industry sources have attributed
the reporting requirement as having galvanized industry into voluntary
pollution reduction goals that in many cases exceed anything required by law.
See CMA Initiative Cuts Toxic Emissions 49 Percent Over Six Years, Official
Says, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 11 (May 3, 1996). Reductions have continued. See
EPA, EPA TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY DATA FOR REPORTING YEAR 2000 (May
23, 2002), reprinted in 33 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1229 (May 31, 2002). For analyses
of the TRI from the perspective of its information effects, see David W. Case,
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for more use of these and similar innovations has not abated.
One attribute that runs commonly through these new tools
of regulation is their ability to tap into decentralized behaviorcoordinating mechanisms.
Market-based programs, for
example, replace bureaucratic decisionmaking with basic
economic incentives to coordinate more efficient decisions by
private actors about, among other things, how and when to
emit pollutants. Information-based programs put information
about regulated activities into the hands of the public, which
may use it in ways centralized agencies might not conceive as
means of pushing individuals, companies, governments, and
other actors to alter environmentally damaging behavior.
Ecosystem-scaled land management promotes decisions that
recognize the holistic, dynamic nature of integrated landscapes,
rather than having one agency make decisions about trees,
another about water, and yet another about butterflies.
Multiparty collaboration puts a more diverse set of interests at
the negotiating table, thus increasing the chances of creative,
multifaceted regulatory responses. And negotiated projectspecific permits allow an agency and an applicant, much like
parties to a contract, to tailor the conditions attached to
regulator approval of a particular activity more efficiently than
could a one-size-fits-all approach to permitting. In short, the
decentralized nature of the second generation instruments of
regulation allows agency policies and decisions to be
implemented more adaptively, which, it is reasonable to
believe, will facilitate a more responsive, flexible continuum of
reactions to the future’s amorphous regulatory challenges.
To take advantage of their inherently adaptive qualities,
however, these regulatory instruments must themselves be
managed adaptively. It will do no good, in other words, to hand
an agency a market-based program only to have the agency
administer the program through centralized decisionmaking.
Nor is it likely that the now-dominant public land use theme of
ecosystem management, which focuses on landscapes and
ecosystem dynamics rather than discrete media or species,11

Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law and
Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379 (2005); and Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance
Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2001).
11. Ecosystem management is a relatively new natural resources policy
model that focuses decisionmaking on the consequences of policy choices to the
integrity of functioning ecosystems. See NAGLE & RUHL, supra note 2, at 299-
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can successfully be implemented through decisionmaking that
relies on reductionist, linear models of how “parts” of
ecosystems function.
Not only must the instruments of
regulation be transformed, therefore, but so too must the
methods of regulation. Hence it is almost universally the case
that advocates of regulatory innovations also advance the
method of implementation known generally as adaptive
management. 12
Today’s voluminous literature on adaptive management
traces its roots to Professor C.S. Holling’s seminal work,
Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management.13
Although almost thirty years have passed since he and his
colleagues first described the adaptive management
methodology, no work on the topic has improved on their core
theory. Its essence is an iterative, incremental decisionmaking
process built around a continuous process of monitoring the
effects of decisions and adjusting decisions accordingly.14 It is,
393 (reviewing the history and content of ecosystem management). In what
remains the most authoritative description of the early roots of ecosystem
management, Grumbine describes ecosystem management as “integrat[ing]
scientific knowledge of ecological relationships within a complex sociopolitical
and values framework toward the general goal of protecting native ecosystem
integrity over the long term.” R. Edward Grumbine, What Is Ecosystem
Management?, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 27, 31 (1994).
12. For example, there is broad consensus today among resource
managers and academics that adaptive management is the only practical way
to implement ecosystem management policy. See Ronald D. Brunner & Tim
W. Clark, A Practice-Based Approach to Ecosystem Management, 11
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 48 (1997); Anne E. Heissenbuttel, Ecosystem
Management—Principles for Practical Application, 6 ECOLOGICAL
APPLICATIONS 730 (1996); Paul L. Ringold et al., Adaptive Management Design
for Ecosystem Monitoring, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 745 (1996). Indeed,
the Ecological Society of America’s comprehensive study of ecosystem
management treats the use of adaptive management methods as a given. See
Norman L. Christensen et al., The Report of the Ecological Society of America
Committee on the Scientific Basis for Ecosystem Management, 6 ECOLOGICAL
APPLICATIONS 665 (1996).
13. See ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (C.S.
Holling ed., 1978). It is universally agreed that adaptive management theory
traces its origins to Holling’s influential work. See, e.g., Kai N. Lee & Jody
Lawrence, Adaptive Management: Learning from the Columbia River Basin
Fish and Wildlife Program, 16 ENVTL. L. 431, 442 n.45 (1986) (tracing the
term “adaptive management” to Holling’s book). For more background on
Holling’s contribution to the discipline of adaptive management, see NAGLE &
RUHL, supra note 2, at 334–38.
14. The biologist Simon Levin recently defined adaptive management
concisely as “maintaining flexibility in management structures and adjusting
rules and regimes on the basis of monitoring and other sources of new data.”
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in other words, far more suited to the needs of future
regulatory challenges than is prescriptive regulation.
My focus, however, is not on what adaptive management
should be, but on whether it can be. Recently, for example, the
National Research Council branch of the National Academy of
Sciences, at the request of several federal agencies, convened a
committee of scientists to explore how adaptive management
might be used to improve resource agency decisionmaking in
the Klamath River Basin, which straddles southern Oregon
The
and northern California (Klamath Committee).15
Committee outlined eight steps of adaptive management: (1)
definition of the problem, (2) determination of goals and
objectives for management of ecosystems, (3) determination of
the ecosystem baseline, (4) development of conceptual models,
(5) selection of future restoration actions, (6) implementation of
management actions, (7) monitoring and ecosystem response,
and (8) evaluation of restoration efforts and proposals for
remedial actions.16 The Committee’s description of the last
stage provides some flavor of how adaptive management differs
from prescriptive regulation:

SIMON LEVIN, FRAGILE DOMINION 200 (1999); see also Simon A. Levin,
Towards a Science of Ecological Management, 3 CONSERVATION ECOLOGY 6
(1999)
(discussing
Holling’s
arguments),
available
at
http://www.consecol.org/vol3/iss2/art6. A more detailed description is found in
a recent report by the National Academy of Science’s research arm, the
National Research Council, in its investigation of the Missouri River
ecosystem:
The concept of adaptive management promotes the notion that
management policies should be flexible and should incorporate new
information as it becomes available. New management actions
should build upon the results of previous experiments in an iterative
process. It stresses the continuous use of scientific information and
monitoring to help organizations and policies change appropriately to
achieve specific environmental and social objectives.
COMMISSION ON MO. RIVER ECOSYSTEM SCI., WATER SCI. & TECH. BD., DIV. ON
EARTH & LIFE STUDIES, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE MISSOURI RIVER
ECOSYSTEM: EXPLORING THE PROSPECTS FOR RECOVERY 18–19 (2002)
[hereinafter
MISSOURI
RIVER
ECOSYSTEM],
available
at
http://books.nap.edu/books/0309083141/html.
15. See COMMITTEE ON ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES IN THE
KLAMATH RIVER BASIN, BD. ON ENVTL. STUDIES & TOXICOLOGY, DIV. ON
EARTH & LIFE STUDIES, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENDANGERED AND
THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN: CAUSES OF DECLINE AND
STRATEGIES
FOR
RECOVERY
(2004),
available
at
http://www.nap.edu/books/0309090970/html. In the interests of full disclosure:
I was a member of the so-called “Klamath Committee.”
16. See id. at 332-35.
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After implementation of specific restoration activities and procedures,
the status of the ecosystem is regularly and systematically reassessed
and described. Comparison of the new state with the baseline state is
a measure of progress toward objectives. The evaluation process
feeds directly into adaptive management by informing the
implementation team and leading to testing of management
hypotheses, new simulations, and proposals for adjustments in
management experiments or development of wholly new experiments
or management strategies.17

As Sidney Shapiro and Robert Glicksman suggest in their
review of regulatory innovations,18 this form of decisionmaking
allows agencies to learn about and respond to changing
conditions at the “back end” rather than loading all
decisionmaking at the “front end,” when the effects of decisions
and of other changing conditions are not yet known.19 This
“front-end/back-end” distinction captures the essence of
adaptive management, and thus, can be used to identify the
features of any regulatory program that hold potential for
adaptive management implementation. The more a program
directs administrative action toward fixing long-term policies
and decisions based on pre-regulatory analysis, the more “frontend” it is. Adaptive management requires institutionalization
of monitoring-adjustment frameworks that allow incremental
policy and decision adjustments at the “back end,” where
performance results can be evaluated and the new information
can be fed back into the ongoing regulatory process. Deliberate
monitoring and a framework for altering course, rapidly and
frequently if conditions warrant, thus are essential ingredients
of adaptive management.
On the one hand, nothing about this is startlingly new or
unusual as a general means of decisionmaking—businesses
implement adaptive management all the time, or they perish.
Ironically, however, the puzzle is whether administrative
agencies can behave adaptively and survive. As a leading

17. Id. at 335.
18. See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION
AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH (2003); Sidney A. Shapiro &
Robert L. Glicksman, The Missing Perspective, ENVTL. F., Mar./Apr. 2003, at
42 [hereinafter Shapiro & Glicksman, The Missing Perspective].
19. Their work demonstrates the folly of attempts “to perfect regulation
on the ‘front end’ by subjecting proposed policies to careful scrutiny using costbenefit analysis and other similar techniques,” arguing instead for methods
that “improve policy on the ‘back end’ by engaging in incremental adjustments
of policy as new information is obtained about how the policy affects the real
world.” Shapiro & Glicksman, The Missing Perspective, supra note 18, at 43.
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proponent of adaptive management once observed, agencies
“have not often been rewarded for flexibility, openness, and
their willingness to experiment, monitor, and adapt.”20 The
deterrents to these core attributes of adaptive management
come from three fronts: legislatures, the public, and the courts.
In short, in order for adaptive management to flourish in
administrative agencies, legislatures must empower them to do
it, interest groups must let them do it, and the courts must
resist the temptation to second-guess when they do in fact do it.
The track record of administrative law from the era of
prescriptive regulation suggests that none of these three
institutional constraints will yield easily. Quite simply, there
is good reason to doubt whether regulation by adaptive
management is possible without substantial change in
administrative law.21
In this Article, I explore this concern using the example of
the Endangered Species Act’s (ESA)22 Habitat Conservation

20. R. Edward Grumbine, Reflections on “What is Ecosystem
Management?”, 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 41, 45 (1997).
21. This view is shared by the few other commentators who have done
exploratory work in the field. See, e.g., Warren T. Coleman, Legal Barriers to
the Restoration of Aquatic Systems and the Utilization of Adaptive
Management, 23 VT. L. REV. 177, 188 (1998) (“Can adaptive management work
within our current legal framework?”); Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management,
the Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional Challenges of “New Age”
Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 54 (2001) (“Institutional
structures and arrangements, in particular, have repeatedly been fingered as
key impediments to realizing the promise of adaptive management.”); see also
Iles, supra note 7, at 301 (“It is difficult to imagine existing Australian law
imposing means to continuously monitor environmental changes and actively
altering remedies to reflect those changes.”). By and large, however, although
support for adaptive management is legion and literature on implementation
theory abounds, from what I can tell very few commentators from science or
law are asking whether it can succeed in the conventional administrative law
system.
22. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
Elsewhere I have explored whether the Act as a whole reflects adaptive
management qualities.
See J.B. Ruhl, Taking Adaptive Management
Seriously: A Case Study of the Endangered Species Act, 52 KAN. L. REV. 1249
(2004). Here, I use the ESA as a case study to examine the constraints
conventional administrative law places on adaptive management in general.
Like the other work, this Article is not intended to provide a comprehensive
overview of the ESA. Rather, it uses the ESA as a case study to focus
attention on the potential obstacles conventional administrative law poses to
the realization of adaptive management principles and techniques in
regulatory contexts. For comprehensive treatments of the ESA, several of
which are referred to frequently infra, see MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J.
ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW (3d ed. 1997);
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Section 9 of the ESA generally
Plan (HCP) program.23
prohibits any act that would injure or kill an animal that is of a
species the federal government has designated as in danger of
extinction.24 The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), which
administers the ESA for terrestrial and freshwater species, has
interpreted section 9 to extend to any habitat modification that
leads to actual death or injury of an endangered species.25 The
effect of that interpretation is that many land development
projects around the nation would violate section 9, except that
section 10 of the ESA provides authority for FWS to issue
permits for “incidental take” of protected species—that is, take
which is incidental to an otherwise lawful activity.26 To obtain
such a permit, an applicant prepares a “conservation plan,”
which has come to be known as a habitat conservation plan
(and thus HCP), demonstrating compliance with a variety of
criteria.27
Through a series of events described in more detail below,
FWS implemented the HCP permit program very much in the

ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES (Donald C. Baur
& Wm. Robert Irvin eds., 2002) [hereinafter LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES];
LAWRENCE R. LIEBESMAN & RAFE PETERSEN, ENVTL. LAW INST., ENDANGERED
SPECIES DESKBOOK (2003); STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y, THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT (2001); and TONY A. SULLINS, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
(2001).
23. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1). This Article also is not intended to provide
a comprehensive overview of the ESA’s HCP program. For a more complete
description of the mechanics of the HCP program, see J.B. Ruhl, How to Kill
Endangered Species, Legally: The Nuts and Bolts of Endangered Species Act
“HCP” Permits for Real Estate Development, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 345 (1999).
24. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(C). For a description of the cases developing
the legal standards for what constitutes “take,” see Gina Guy, Take
Prohibitions and Section 9, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 22,
at 191; LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 22, at 39–46; Steven P. Quarles &
Thomas R. Lundquist, When Do Land Use Activities “Take” Listed Wildlife
Under ESA Section 9 and the “Harm” Regulation?, in LAW, POLICY, AND
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 22, at 207; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y, supra
note 22, at 104–12; SULLINS, supra note 22, at 44–54; and Alan M. Glen &
Craig M. Douglas, Taking Species: Difficult Questions of Proximity and Degree,
16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 65 (2001). For a description of the process for
identifying, or “listing,” species as endangered or threatened, see LIEBESMAN
& PETERSEN, supra note 22, at 15–20; J.B. Ruhl, Section 4 of the ESA: The
Keystone of Species Protection Law, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 22, at 19; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y, supra note 22, at 38–58; and
SULLINS, supra note 22, at 11–25.
25. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.31 (2004).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
27. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A).
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model of a negotiated site-specific permitting program
combined with a market-based mechanism for compensation of
habitat impacts. Moreover, the agency announced its resolve to
implement the program using an adaptive management
approach. While the effort produced some initial success,
ambiguous legislative delegation of authority, aggressive
interest group opposition, and skeptical courts have all kept the
HCP program mired in the swamp of old school prescriptive
regulation. There is probably no regulatory program more in
need of adaptive management than the conservation of
endangered species, yet the adaptive energy is being sucked
dry from the HCP program by the institutions of
administrative law.
How can this have come to be, and what can be done to
improve the overall situation of adaptive management in
administrative law? Part I of this Article briefly places those
questions in the general background of interest—the potential
for collision between adaptive management theory and
administrative law institutions—to more firmly illustrate the
nature of the problem. Part II then grounds the topic in a realworld context through the story of the HCP program. Although
Congress appears to have hoped that the HCP program would
promote adaptive management of imperiled species, its
delegation of authority to FWS was an imprint of prescriptive
regulation. Nevertheless, during the 1990s, while Congress
was functionally inert on reform of the ESA despite much
rhetorical enthusiasm, FWS essentially reinvented the
program through administrative reform in the mold of adaptive
management. Soon, however, citizen groups representing
environmentalist interests responded with vociferous and
litigious opposition to reform, ultimately bearing down on the
agency’s injection of “flexibility” into the program through
repeated lawsuits challenging HCP permits. With few (but
notable) exceptions, the courts were all too quick to pounce as
well, stifling the agency’s willingness to experiment. The result
could be one of the tragedies of environmental and
administrative law. Today, the HCP program increasingly
resembles a plain vanilla regulatory program: functional, but
increasingly stripped of its once promising adaptive qualities.
One can only hope this is not a harbinger for the future of
adaptive management in general. If it is, regulation by
adaptive management will not be possible.
In the long run, however, the need to use adaptive
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approaches will not diminish—if anything, it will only increase.
Thus the pressure to reform administrative law will be
unyielding.
As gloomy as the prospects for adaptive
management
appear
today,
regulation
by
adaptive
management is inevitable. But knowing this makes it tempting
to cast aside the conventions of administrative law too quickly.
The process of making regulation more adaptive should itself
implement the adaptive management approach. Before we
change anything about administrative law, we need first to
define the problem, set objectives, assess the baseline, and
formulate models. Hence this Article closes by suggesting a
basic model to use in thinking about regulation by adaptive
management.
I. ADAPTING TO ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT
The Klamath Committee’s list of the eight stages of
adaptive management gives the false impression that adaptive
management is a linear checklist with a beginning and an end.
Rather, adaptive management is a cyclical decisionmaking
process. For example, consolidating the eight stages into four
core functions, adaptive management looks like this:
Define Problem and
Objectives

Monitor and Evaluate
Performance

Select Reference
Baseline and Models

Select and Implement
Management Actions

While the logical starting point for introduction of this
form of adaptive management into any particular policy
solution is the definition of problem and objectives, there is no
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logical terminus. Particularly for problems such as invasive
species—which we are unlikely ever fully to eradicate—
adaptive management, once started, anticipates literally
endless application. All along the way, cycle after cycle,
countless decisions are made about what the problem entails,
what the objectives are, which models seem best suited, how
and when to implement management actions, which
performance metrics to measure, and what to do when things
do not go as planned. As new information continuously enters
the stream of decisions, sound management may require an
agency practicing adaptive management to replace objectives,
models, or performance criteria “on the fly.”28
To anyone familiar with conventional administrative law,
this sounds nothing like what actually happens.29 With broad
latitude to delegate legislative power and processes to
administrative agencies, legislatures intending to regulate
behavior through administrative institutions exhibit a
spectrum of approaches from open-ended mandates to
micromanaged authority. But one truly searches in vain for
legislation that establishes anything like the decisionmaking
cycle of adaptive management. Instead, most administrative
agencies increasingly are required to engage in a tremendous
amount of foreplay before promulgating a rule or adjudicating a
decision. Most of this pre-decisional activity is geared toward
serving two goals: public participation and judicial review.
Interest groups enter the process primarily through notice and
comment
opportunities,
rights
of
participation
in
administrative hearings, and actions for judicial review of
administrative actions. Courts engaging in such judicial review
defer to agencies in many aspects of substantive outcome, but
nonetheless demand thorough explanations of the rationales for
agency decisions, take a “hard look” at how the agencies
connect the dots, and show little tolerance for any procedural
28. As Holly Doremus aptly sums up, “A management program cannot be
adaptive unless decisions are always subject to re-evaluation in light of new
information.” Doremus, supra note 21, at 55.
29. This paragraph is not intended to provide a complete exposition on the
plodding, inefficient nature of conventional administrative law. Jim Salzman
and I have done so, and have pointed to the extensive body of literature on the
topic in J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem
of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 Geo. L.J. 757 (2003).
Shapiro and Glicksman review it ably in their work on the “front end/back
end” distinction. Shapiro & Glicksman, The Missing Perspective, supra note
18, at 42-43.
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slips.
It is little wonder that, having to operate in an atmosphere
in which each decision involves so much “front-end”
preparation designed largely in anticipation of the onslaught of
the public’s “participation” and judges’ “hard looks,” many
agencies display an aversion to adaptation. For example, a
recent study of over 392 federal agency rules issued in
November and December 2003 found that the mean number of
days to completion of the final rule from date of first proposal
was 322.30 If public comments were presented, the mean period
increased to 414 days.31 If the agency made any significant
changes from the proposal to the final rule—in other words,
adapted to the public comments—the mean time was 472
days.32 As this demonstrates, a single instance of adaptation in
the course of a rulemaking can add about 150 days to the
agency’s decision timeline.33
More broadly, a recent General Accounting Office report
found that innovative environmental regulation by the states
faced significant obstacles at the federal level because of
“cultural resistance among many in [the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA)] toward alternative approaches” and
the lack of “explicit language authorizing the use of innovative
environmental approaches.”34 State officials reported that the
resistance from EPA “often manifested itself in a lengthy and
Bottom line:
costly EPA review of their proposals.”35
30. See Stuart Shapiro, Two Months in the Life of the Regulatory State, 30
ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Spring 2005, at 12, 15 tbl.5.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. The empirical study demonstrates that rulemaking is, in general, a
skewed process, with relatively few rules.
Those rules with general
application affecting significant social or economic interests receive most of the
public comments and agency time. But public comment adds time even in the
median case: the median time for completion for all rules was 175 days; the
median for rules with comments was 285 days; and the median for rules that
changed significantly in response to comments was 366 days. See id. Agency
adaptation in the median case added almost 200 days, even longer in the
mean case. See id.
34. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO INNOVATIVE STATE REGULATORY PROGRAMS 3
(2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02268.pdf.
35. Id.; see also David L. Markell, States as Innovators: It's Time for a
New Look to Our "Laboratories of Democracy" in the Effort to Improve Our
Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347, 376 & n.124
(1994) (noting the New York environmental agency's view that changes in the
“regulatory culture” at the federal level are needed to facilitate effective
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adaptation in the current milieu takes time and resources, with
little payoff, so why bother?
With this general experience in mind, it would seem
unreasonable, even cruel, to command agencies to engage in
adaptive management of their rulemaking and other
decisionmaking without changing the rules of the game. Given
that adaptive management contemplates a continuous cycle of
decisions, decisions many of which under conventional
administrative law would trigger the full-blown process
described above, the adaptive management decision cycle would
rotate slowly and painfully.
Today agencies are under pressure to act more efficiently
and flexibly with no explicit adaptive management framework
for doing so. As a result, agencies must search through their
inventories of authority for every possible opportunity to adjust
their objectives, models, management actions, and performance
criteria without opening the door to the flood of citizen suits
and judicial glares. At best, they may cobble together some set
of tools that they can, with some sense of credibility, think of as
adaptive management and hope nobody notices what they are
doing.36
Despite these efforts, over time agencies will find that
interest groups and courts relentlessly will peck away at
adaptive agency behavior, using all the armament that
conventional administrative law puts at their disposal. A
stunning example comes from the litigation over the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers’ management of the Missouri River
navigation and flow regime system. The background is long
and complex,37 but a recent crescendo came when a court
rejected Missouri’s claim, one among many, that the Corps had
violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)38 by

operation of the cooperative federalism system of environmental law).
36. For a discussion of the places agencies might look for such authorities,
see Robert L. Glicksman & Sidney A. Shapiro, Improving Regulation Through
Incremental Adjustment, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179 (2004).
37. For comprehensive backgrounds, see MISSOURI RIVER ECOSYSTEM,
supra note 14, at 1-106; John H. Davidson & Thomas Earl Geu, The Missouri
River and Adaptive Management: Protecting Ecological Functions and Legal
Process, 80 NEB. L. REV. 816, 817-862 (2001); and also South Dakota v.
Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir. 2003).
38. NEPA requires all federal agencies to prepare an EIS for all “major
federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000).
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adopting an adaptive management approach.39 The Corps’
“victory” sowed the seeds of a long future of litigation:
Adaptive management is an approach to natural resources
management in which policy choices are made incrementally. As
each choice is made, data on the effects of these choices are collected
and analyzed in order to assess whether to retain, reverse, or
otherwise alter the policy choice. Missouri maintains that the
adaptive management approach violates NEPA because it permits the
Corps to circumvent the NEPA process when policy choices are
modified. Missouri takes issue with the potential flow changes that
the Corps may undertake in the future. Missouri fails to point to any
evidence that indicates that the Corps intends to avoid its NEPA
obligations by implementing this adaptive management approach. To
the contrary, the Corps acknowledges that in the event a major policy
change results, the Corps will be required to comply with NEPA.
Absent evidence that the adaptive management process actually
results in the Corps’ evasion of NEPA obligations, the Court declines
to declare this approach invalid.40

In other words, the Corps did not err in law by adopting
adaptive management as its implementation method; rather, it
erred in sensibility by doing so, because it opened the door to
litigation over whether each policy adjustment triggers NEPA.
One might wonder how pleased the Corps was to have
prevailed on those terms.
Indeed, recent NEPA decisions by the Supreme Court
highlight the perverse disincentives in conventional
administrative law that hinder adaptive decisionmaking of the
kind the Corps has flirted with. In Norton v. Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance41 and Department of Transportation v.
Public Citizen,42 the Court established in no uncertain terms
that if an agency lacks discretion over some aspect of an action,
or has reached a decision within its discretion and divested
itself of further discretion to alter the decision, NEPA does not
apply. This principle benefits an agency in a “front-end” world
of administrative law, allowing it to dodge the NEPA bullet,
but it provides a strong disincentive to establishing and
retaining long-term adaptive management programs. After all,
39. See In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 1145
(D. Minn. 2004), aff’d, 421 F.3d 618 (8th Cir. 2005).
40. Id. at 1163-64 (citations omitted); see also Confederated Tribes of the
Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Washington, No. 03-075, 2004 WL 322135
(Wash. Poll. Control Bd. Feb. 13, 2004) (expressing skepticism over whether
the agency’s use of adaptive management satisfied legal standards and
requiring evidentiary hearing).
41. 542 U.S. 55 (2004).
42. 541 U.S. 752 (2004).
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continuing discretion to alter a decision is the essence of
adaptive management. Thus, the clear message to agencies
under conventional administrative law is that they adopt
adaptive management at their own peril. Adopting adaptive
management may be an agency’s dream; practicing it is a
nightmare. This sobering conclusion is confirmed by the HCP
experience.
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE HCP ADAPTIVE
MANAGEMENT EXPERIMENT
Generally, land use regulation has long been a breeding
ground of “front-end” approaches to regulatory decisionmaking,
and thus is likely to be resistant to change. As Holly Doremus
summarizes the field:
Our dominant paradigm for regulation of private land development is
one-time review prior to a proposed action. Proposals for timber
harvests, subdivision development, or wetlands filling are either
approved or disapproved. If they are approved, we are accustomed to
that being the end of the story. We have very little history of
continuing oversight of private land management, requiring changes
over time if our preliminary assessment of the likely environmental
impacts proves inaccurate.43

For example, although the ESA explicitly recognizes the
importance of ecosystem integrity to imperiled species,44 its
species-focused statutory structure does little to address that
connection in any positive law sense.45 As our understanding of
the complexities of species decline and its relation to ecosystem
change has advanced tremendously since the early 1970s,
increasingly we are finding the ESA ill-equipped to handle the
task for which it was intended. One of the first such struggles
for the ESA was what to do about private land uses that
disturb or destroy habitat occupied by endangered species.
Other than the section 9 prohibition of take, there was no
provision in the original enactment addressing such situations.
Yet as urban growth increasingly encroached upon species
habitat, the need for a permit-based option became more
pressing. A development project at San Bruno Mountain on
California’s San Francisco Peninsula brought this issue to a
43. Doremus, supra note 21, at 55.
44. One purpose of the ESA is “to provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend
may be conserved.” 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000).
45. See J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Management, the ESA, and the Seven
Degrees of Relevance, 14 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 156 (2000).
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head when a habitat for an endangered butterfly was ground
zero for the prime development property.46 Thus began the rise
and fall of the HCP adaptive management experiment.
A. LEGISLATIVE DELEGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSE
With this San Bruno Mountain development directly in
mind, Congress in 1982 amended the ESA to create the HCP
program in section 10(a)(1).47 The legislative history makes it
clear that Congress had intended a flexible program that would
“encourage creative partnerships between the public and
private sectors.”48
As a delegation of regulatory authority, however, section
10(a)(1) does little to implement “creativity” and less to
encourage adaptive management. The program is structured
around a “front-end” process designed to reach long-term
predictions about project impacts on species. To approve a
permit, for example, the agency must find that the HCP
ensures that “the applicant will, to the maximum extent
practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts of such taking,”
and that “the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood
of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild.”49
Although FWS may impose “terms and conditions” in the
permit, “including, but not limited to, such reporting
requirements as the [agency] deems necessary for determining
whether such terms and conditions are being complied with,”50
it is not always practical for FWS to embed adaptive
management monitoring and reporting into permits through
this authority. In many cases, the harm to the species that
prompts the need for an HCP permit occurs only in the
construction phase of a project. It is not clear from the
statutory structure how FWS could exercise adaptive
management adjustments based on new information that
becomes available during the operational phase of such a
project. Thus, the overall statutory version of the HCP
program leaves much to be desired when it comes to
46. The project background is described in Friends of Endangered Species,
Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976 ( 9th Cir. 1985).
47. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 6,
96 Stat. 1411, 1422-25 (1982).
48. H.R. REP. NO. 97-835, at 30 (1982) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2871.
49. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii), (iv) (2000).
50. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B).
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establishing a cohesive adaptive management framework.
Although the San Bruno Mountain HCP was successfully
concluded, perhaps not surprisingly, very little else happened
under section 10(a)(1) over the next decade.51 The politics of
the ESA changed all of that in the early 1990s, as the
regulatory reinvention movement52 spread to the ESA. The
result was an injection of adaptive management into the HCP
program through administrative reform rather than legislative
initiative.53
As the new Secretary of the Interior under the incoming
Clinton Administration, Bruce Babbitt was caught between a
rock and a hard place when he inherited the ESA. The
statute’s reputation had reached a low point in the Republicancontrolled Congress, while at the same time, many
environmental protection interest groups were poised to
condemn any effort that would, in their view, weaken the
statute.54 To fend off both fronts, Babbitt embarked on a twopart agenda focused on enhancing species conservation through
greater emphasis on ecosystems, and on providing greater
balance to landowners on whose property the imperiled species
are found.55
51. By 1992, for example, the FWS had issued only twelve HCP permits,
whereas it had issued 225 by October 1, 1997. LAURA C. HOOD, DEFENDERS
OF WILDLIFE, FRAYED SAFETY NETS: CONSERVATION PLANNING UNDER THE
ENDANGERED
SPECIES
ACT,
at
vi–xiii
(1998)
available
at
http://www.defenders.org/pubs/hcp02.html.
For background on these
developments and the HCP program in general, see Shi-Ling Hsu, The
Potential and the Pitfalls of Habitat Conservation Planning Under the
Endangered Species Act, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,592 (1999);
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in
Takings & Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305 (1997); Robert D. Thornton,
Habitat Conservation Plans: Frayed Safety Nets or Creative Partnerships?, 16
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 94 (2001); Eric Fisher, Comment, Habitat
Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act: No Surprises & the
Quest for Certainty, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 371 (1996); and Albert C. Lin,
Comment, Participants’ Experiences with Habitat Conservation Plans and
Suggestions for Streamlining the Process, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 369 (1996).
52. See PRESIDENT WILLIAM J. CLINTON & VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE,
REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (1995), reprinted in Daily Env’t
Rep.
(BNA),
at
E-1
(Mar.
17,
1995),
available
at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/rsreport/251a.html.
53. I have previously reviewed some of the events discussed infra from the
perspective of adaptive management. See Ruhl, supra note 22, at 1273-80.
54. For a more thorough account of the political factors that set the stage,
see John D. Leshy, The Babbitt Legacy at the Department of the Interior: A
Preliminary View, 31 ENVTL. L. 199, 208–12 (2000).
55. See J.B. Ruhl, Who Needs Congress? An Agenda for Administrative
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The most prominent example of the impact this approach
had on the ESA is the life it breathed into the HCP program,
causing it to be lauded as “a sweeping new approach to
protecting endangered species.”56 By treating HCPs as a
“thrash it out” form of contract negotiation,57 Babbitt turned
the administrative version of the HCP program into a “backend” approach for resolving the ever-increasing instances of
collision between the ESA take prohibition and urban growth.
Landowners increasingly participated in site-specific HCP
negotiations as a practical means of resolving ESA issues with
lasting certainty,58 while the agency increasingly promoted the
ecosystem scale of the program.59 The number of HCP permits
began to grow in the early 1990s,60 and with experience, the
agency added structure and standards to the program while
retaining the flexibility to accommodate the changing needs of
species and landowners.61 HCP permits began to proliferate
under Babbitt’s tenure, with several hundred having been
approved by the end of his term.62
Reform of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 367, 388–400
(1998) (providing a survey of policies serving this purpose). For an insider’s
account providing a thoughtful perspective on the strategic approach the
Babbitt administration took, see Leshy, supra note 54, at 212–14.
56. Daniel A. Farber, A Tale of Two Cases, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 33, 38
(2001).
57. See Bruce Babbitt, Address to the National Press Club Luncheon (July
17, 1996), quoted in Thornton, supra note 51, at 95.
58. Several commentators have stressed the negotiation-based character
of the HCP program. See Farber, supra note 56, at 43; Hsu, supra note 51, at
10,594–600; Ruhl, supra note 23, at 391–96.
59. See Thornton, supra note 51, at 94–95.
60. See NATIONAL CTR. FOR ECOLOGICAL ANALYSIS & SYNTHESIS &
AMERICAN INST. OF BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, USING SCIENCE IN HABITAT
CONSERVATIONS PLANS 6 (1999) [hereinafter USING SCIENCE IN HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLANS], available at http://www.nceas.ucsb.edu/nceasweb/projects/97KAREI2/hcp-1999-01-14.pdf. In the interests of full disclosure:
during this timeframe I was engaged in private practice and frequently
represented applicants for HCP permits.
61. For example, the FWS has published a lengthy handbook describing
the steps required to obtain an HCP permit. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. &
NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., ENDANGERED SPECIES HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLANNING HANDBOOK (1996) [hereinafter HCP HANDBOOK],
available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/hcp/hcpbook.html.
62. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS:
SECTION 10 OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (2002), available at
http://endangered.fws.gov/hcp/HCP_Incidental_Take.pdf.
For a running
count, see U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., GENERAL STATISTICS FOR
ENDANGERED SPECIES, http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/TessStatReport (last
updated Oct. 24, 2005). For an excellent statistical summary of the 208 HCP
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In addition to adopting a contract negotiation model for
HCPs, FWS promoted a market-based approach for habitat
mitigation requirements that are made conditions of particular
HCP permits.63 The central topic of the negotiations for HCPs
is what habitat the applicant will “trade” in return for the
habitat that will be impaired as a result of the development
project. Turning from this barter approach to a program even
closer to market-based mechanisms, FWS recently developed a
policy for the “banking” of endangered species habitat64
modeled on the more mature version of habitat banking found
in the wetlands protection program under section 404 of the
Clean Water Act.65 As a logical extension of the HCP program,
habitat banking allows some landowners to assemble and
restore significant holdings of prime habitat for listed species
and to market “credits” in the habitat to other landowners in
need of mitigation habitat to satisfy their HCP permit
permits that the FWS had issued nationally by August 1997, including
acreage statistics, see USING SCIENCE IN HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS,
supra note 60.
63. Mitigation for impacts to endangered species or their habitat can be
achieved through “compensating for the impact,” such as through restoring or
protecting habitat at an onsite or offsite location. See HCP HANDBOOK, supra
note 61, at 3-19 to 3-20.
64. See Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and Operation of
Conservation Banks, 68 Fed. Reg. 24,753 (May 8, 2003).
65. See Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of
Mitigation Banks, 60 Fed. Reg. 58,605 (Nov. 28, 1995) (clarifying the manner
in which mitigation banks may be used to satisfy mitigation requirements of
the Clean Water Act). Although the Corps has long applied a mitigation policy
to regulated fill of jurisdictional wetlands, initially that policy focused on, even
preferred, mitigation on the site of the project seeking a section 404 permit.
Over time, however, the Corps found that the onsite mitigation preference led
to a proliferation of “postage stamp” mitigation sites that presented serious
administrative monitoring and enforcement concerns. Indeed, many studies
have shown that onsite mitigation generally failed to produce compensatory
wetland resource values. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, NEW
ENGLAND DIST., SUCCESS OF CORPS-REQUIRED WETLAND MITIGATION IN NEW
ENGLAND (2003); WASHINGTON DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, WASHINGTON STATE
WETLAND MITIGATION EVALUATION STUDY (2002); NEW JERSEY DEP’T OF
ENVTL. PROT., CREATING INDICATORS OF WETLAND STATUS (QUANTITY AND
QUALITY): FRESHWATER WETLAND MITIGATION IN NEW JERSEY (2002).
Consequently, during the 1990s the Corps gradually moved first to an offsite
compensatory mitigation policy, and eventually toward the mitigation banking
concept, officially blessing it in the 1995 multi-agency policy laying out the
basic design and implementation standards. For a comprehensive overview of
the wetlands mitigation banking program and comparison of it to endangered
species habitat banking approaches, see Michael J. Bean & Lynn E. Dwyer,
Mitigation Banking as an Endangered Species Conservation Tool, 30 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,537 (2000).
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conditions. The conservation values accruing to the species
within the banked habitat area are translated by the
regulatory authority into quantified “credits,” and each
development project’s negative impacts to the species are
quantified through the permitting process into mitigation
needs or “debits.” The debit holders can retire their regulatory
“debt” by purchasing an offsetting number of credits from an
owner of a bank located within a specified geographic area,
with the market, rather then the regulators, determining the
price of the credits. Presumably, bank owners enter the
banking enterprise because they believe their cost of generating
credits through land acquisition and resource management will
be more than amply recovered in the credit market.
Meanwhile, projects in need of regulatory approvals can
purchase bank credits as a means of satisfying mitigation
requirements in a manner that is less expensive than other
measures such as dedicating project lands or purchasing and
managing conservation lands directly. Thus, a supply of and
demand for credits should emerge. To make this a three-way
win, regulatory agencies believe that conservation banking is
good for the species as well, as it promotes a more orderly
system for securing permanently dedicated conservation lands
and attracts persons with true expertise to the “industry” of
creating and managing those lands. It is common, therefore, to
hear conservation banking described as “a free-market
enterprise that offers landowners economic incentives to
protect natural resources, saves developers time and money by
providing them with certainty of pre-approved compensation
lands, and provides long-term protection of habitat.”66
Although there has yet to be any substantial experience under
the new program, it appears the FWS has developed a flexible
framework for habitat banking that meets the expectations of
many environmentalists and landowners.67

66. Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and Operation of Conservation
Banks, 68 Fed. Reg. at 24,753.
67. In 2000, Bean and Dwyer, both of Environmental Defense, offered
many thoughtful principles for construction of an endangered species habitat
banking program, even drafting a proposed policy, and the program the FWS
has developed incorporates many of their guidelines. Compare Bean & Dwyer,
supra note 65, at 10,546–56, with Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and
Operation of Conservation Banks, 68 Fed. Reg. at 24,753. To be sure,
implementing banking programs, particularly habitat-based banking
programs, poses significant challenges to ensure appropriate environmental
results. But, if carefully constructed and monitored, they are promising in
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The design of HCPs as negotiated regulatory instruments
that take advantage of market-based mitigation led naturally
to an adaptive management theme. Indeed, not long after the
HCP permit program was fully on its feet, FWS announced it
would henceforth administer permits under the ESA by using
adaptive management as a means to “examine alternative
strategies for meeting measurable biological goals and
objectives through research and/or monitoring, and then, if
necessary, to adjust future conservation management actions
according to what is learned.”68 FWS thus portrayed adaptive
management as an important practical tool that “can assist the
Services and the applicant in developing an adequate operating
conservation program and improving its effectiveness.”69 FWS
also intended adaptive management to foster continuing
relations between the parties after issuance of the incidental
take permit, serving the agencies’ goal of promoting long-term,
collaborative “conservation partnerships” with landowners.70

that regard. For a thorough review of the promise and pitfalls of habitat
banking programs generally, see James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and
the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2000).
68. Notice of Availability of a Draft Addendum to the Final Handbook for
Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 64
Fed. Reg. 11,485, 11,486 (Mar. 9, 1999). Accordingly, HCPs are acknowledged
to be working hypotheses of how species will respond to changes in habitat
size, location, configuration, and quality.
To truly integrate adaptive
management into an HCP, the plan must include a monitoring program to
evaluate the performance of mitigation measures and a system that
automatically triggers alternative conservation actions in the event that
performance fails to meet conservation goals. See Gregory A. Thomas, Where
Property Rights and Biodiversity Converge Part III: Incorporating Adaptive
Management and the Precautionary Principle into HCP Design, 18
ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE 32, 34–35 (2001); George F. Wilhere, Adaptive
Management in Habitat Conservation Plans, 16 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 20
(2002).
69. Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for
Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65
Fed. Reg. 35,242, 35,252 (June 1, 2000). For an in-depth discussion of the
integration of adaptive management into the HCP program during Babbitt’s
tenure, see Doremus, supra note 21, at 68–74.
70. As one FWS official has explained:
We will continue to incorporate contingency planning within all types
of HCPs. In the future, HCPs will have improved structure in their
adaptive management strategies. . . . Increased structure in adaptive
management strategies will require increased vigilance on the part of
permittees and the Service during implementation of long-term plans;
this reflects the nature of the conservation partnership created by
HCPs.
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And for environmentalists, adaptive management, if faithfully
implemented, can be used to offset information gaps by
building more robust monitoring, evaluation, and revision
processes into the permit.71
As a result, although Congress clearly did not install
adaptive management as the method of implementation for
HCPs, the ambiguity it left in the statute gave Babbitt the
room the agency needed to do so through administrative
reform. While the initiative surely would have been on firmer
ground had the statute even so much as mentioned adaptive
management, the enthusiastic response of landowners to the
reformed HCP program suggested that Congress would have
little complaint about what the agency had accomplished. In
short, had it come to its full fruition, the integration of adaptive
management in the HCP process, which is by no means
required or even signaled in the statute, would have truly
marked HCPs as “a system of negotiation rather than one of
unilateral federal imposition on landowners.”72 Alas, that is far
from the end of the story.
B. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
While FWS was patting itself on the back for its foray into
adaptive management, widespread concern surfaced among
environmental protection interests about how the agency
implemented the adaptive management theme.73 The major
sore spot was the perceived lack of meaningful public

Marj Nelson, The Changing Face of HCPs, ENDANGERED SPECIES BULL.,
July/Aug 2000, at 4, 7. To be sure, adaptive management, to be implemented,
does not require establishing collaborative relations between regulators and
other interested parties. Most adaptive management advocates, however,
portray it as most effective when it is housed in a collaborative framework.
See generally BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY: BALANCING INTERESTS THROUGH
ADAPTIVE COLLABORATIVE MANAGEMENT (Louise E. Buck et al. eds., 2001).
71. See Thomas, supra note 68, at 36 (suggesting that where information
critical to the HCP design is scarce or uncertain, the HCP should be shorter in
duration, cover a smaller area, avoid irreversible impacts, require that
mitigation measures be accomplished before take is allowed, include
contingencies, and have more rigorous monitoring).
72. Farber, supra note 56, at 43.
73. See, e.g., HOOD, supra note 51, at vi–xiii (presenting a pessimistic
assessment of the HCP program); John Kostyack, Surprise!, 15 ENVTL. F.,
Mar.–Apr. 1998, at 19, 19–24 (presenting extensive criticism of the Babbitt
Administration’s HCP reforms from an attorney for National Wildlife
Federation); see generally Thornton, supra note 51, at 95–96 (describing other
organizations’ criticisms).
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participation in the HCP negotiation process. By the late
1990s, environmental groups had begun to complain that
mitigation decisions in the HCP program were taking place
without following “biological standards”—in other words, not
according to the traditional permitting system—and to demand
more public participation as a result.74 For example, in 1999
the Defenders of Wildlife offered the following description of
the HCP permitting process:
Citizens from various stakeholder groups have no formal role in the
HCP process except through the public comment period and, for some
plans, through the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) or
requirements of state or local law. Often, by the time public meetings
occur or official drafts are released for comment, however, both the
regulated interests and the services have invested so much money
and time in plan development that they are unlikely to change course.
. . . [C]itizens (including those representing the environmental
community) generally have not had a seat at the negotiating table in
many major recent negotiations despite the fact that conservationists
(in addition to FWS) represent the public’s interest in protecting
endangered species.
...
. . . For the vast majority of plans . . . public participation was not
adequate, given the plans’ large effects on public resources. The most
glaring examples are large-scale, single-landowner plans that
significantly affect public resources . . . . While those plans did have
public meetings and/or formal comment periods, the conservation
strategies resulted from private negotiations with largely token
attempts at listening to the public’s concerns. In addition, numerous
small-scale HCPs reviewed here involved exclusive negotiations
between the landowner and FWS . . . .
...
. . . This lack of public participation has resulted from an absence of
formal requirements to involve the public and the limited leverage of
citizens who do not have a direct financial stake in negotiations.75

A similar theme emerged with respect to the interplay
between HCP adaptive management and the parallel objective
of providing fairness to landowners. Another policy the Babbitt
administration introduced to the HCP process, the so-called
“No Surprises” provision, was designed to relieve the HCP
74. See, e.g., HOOD, supra note 51, at 59-61, 80-81 (1998) (summarizing
Defenders of Wildlife’s critique of HCP program).
75. HOOD, supra note 51, at 41, 43-44; see also Holly Doremus, Preserving
Citizen Participation in the Era of Reinvention: The Endangered Species Act
Example, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707 (1999) (examining the growing tension
between the HCP and other ESA reform programs and public participation
values).
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permit holder of any additional conservation obligations beyond
those specified in the HCP regarding unforeseen circumstances
that arise after the HCP is issued.76 The policy was not
popular with environmental protection interest groups, which
argued that the No Surprises policy may constrain the use of
adaptive management, as it cuts off revision of prior
agreements about the HCP’s conservation measures.77
On the other hand, one might just as reasonably observe
that adaptive management undermines the No Surprises
policy, as the very purpose of adaptive management is to
ensure the ability to adjust decisions after the HCP is issued.
But a third view is that the two policies can be implemented as
complementary, not conflicting.78 The No Surprises policy
simply defines who is responsible for measures necessary to
address unforeseen circumstances.
Additionally, a
comprehensive,
criteria-specific
adaptive
management
provision in an HCP negates the argument that matters
contemplated as adaptive management were unforeseen for
purposes of the No Surprises policy. It should be in the
interests of the agency and the applicant, therefore, to
negotiate an adaptive management provision that spells out its
76. Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances (“No Surprises”) Rule, 63 Fed.
Reg. 8859, 8860 (Feb. 23, 1998). The policy has been described as an essential
component of the HCP program, necessary to make HCPs attractive to
landowners. See Fred P. Bosselman, The Statutory and Constitutional
Mandate for a No Surprises Policy, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707, 717-19 (1997).
77. See Doremus, supra note 21, at 72–73. Indeed, in recent litigation
brought to challenge the No Surprises Rule, a federal district court identified
procedural errors in the agency’s rule promulgation. See Spirit of the Sage
Council v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2003). The court found that the
FWS did not follow proper notice and comment procedures in promulgating
the so-called Permit Revocation Rule, which explains how and when the FWS
can revoke a permit when it is evident continued use of the permit would
violate the ESA. Id. at 92. Because the agency made the Permit Revocation
Rule an integral component in its substantive defense of the previouslyadopted No Surprises Rule, the court also remanded the No Surprises Rule
even though it was adopted through proper notice and comment procedures.
Id. Yet, the court declined to vacate or enjoin implementation of the No
Surprises Rule itself and made no substantive findings on either rule. In
response, FWS reissued final rules governing incidental take permit
revocations. See Endangered Species Act Incidental Take Permit Revocation
Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,723 (Dec. 10, 2004). The court has yet to rule on
any of the substantive claims in the case, but presumably with the procedural
defects resolved that phase of the litigation will resume.
78. For an additional discussion of this point, see J.B. Ruhl, Is the
Endangered Species Act Eco-Pragmatic?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 885, 935 n.221
(2003).
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scope and subject matter with clarity and precision. Hence,
with deliberate attention by the permitting agency to the
contours and interplay of the adaptive management and No
Surprises provisions of an HCP, the two policies seem perfectly
capable of meeting their respective objectives.79
Indeed, many HCPs issued after the No Surprises rule was
enacted contain substantial adaptive management provisions
that detail a comprehensive monitoring and adjustment
protocol and specify the kinds of events and responses for
which adjustments will be made.80 Nevertheless, the pressure
for more public input on this and other aspects of HCP permits
continued to build, culminating in a wave of litigation against
specific HCP permits testing both the general validity of the
agency’s HCP program policies and the agency’s particular
application thereof.
C. JUDICIAL REVIEW
Interest groups did not waste time launching an assault on
the HCP program, challenging the San Bruno Mountain HCP81
on three claims that would appear time and again in later HCP
79. See Jan S. Pauw & James R. Johnston, Habitat Planning Under the
ESA on Commercial Forestlands, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 102, 104–05
(2001) (suggesting the two policies are compatible).
80. See, e.g., Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
202 F. Supp. 2d 594 (W.D. Tex. 2002). This case involved an HCP issued in
2001 to the LaCantera commercial development in San Antonio, Texas. As
discussed infra, the plaintiff environmental group challenged virtually every
aspect of the permit, including the adequacy of the adaptive management
provisions, but lost on every claim. The court’s discussion of the adaptive
management provisions emphasized the comprehensive and detailed nature of
the monitoring and response protocols. See id. at 616. In the interest of full
disclosure: I served as a consultant to the HCP applicant in the case. Another
example is the elaborate thirty-five page adaptive management provision
found in the HCP issued to Plum Creek Timber Company for 1.6 million acres
of its timberland holdings in the Pacific Northwest, which include habitat of
endangered fish. See PLUM CREEK TIMBER CO., FINAL PLUM CREEK TIMBER
COMPANY NATIVE FISH HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN 8-1 to 8-32 (Sept. 2000).
More recently, FWS joined with other state and federal agencies to develop a
detailed technical guidance for monitoring protocols to assist adaptive
management in large-scale HCPs. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR ET AL.,
DESIGNING MONITORING PROGRAMS IN AN ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT CONTEXT
FOR REGIONAL MULTIPLE SPECIES CONSERVATION PLANS (2004), available at
http://www.dfg.ca.gov/nccp/pubs/monframewk10-04.pdf.
The No Surprises
Rule, in other words, cannot be blamed for the withering of adaptive
management in the HCP program.
81. See Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976 (9th
Cir. 1985).
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challenges: First, FWS did not provide adequate support for its
required finding that the HCP “will not appreciably reduce the
likelihood of the survival of the species,”82 second, the HCP did
not “to the maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate
the impacts” to the species,83 and third, the agency’s decision
not to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
under NEPA84 was not supported. The court decided that
HCPs should be reviewed similar to other environmental
permits, under the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary
and capricious” standard of review,85 and found the agency’s
permit acceptable on all claims under that standard.
HCP litigation went into remission after this decision and
did not resurface until after Babbitt’s reforms had taken hold.
In 1998, a court found two FWS-issued HCP permits that
allowed construction in the habitat of the Alabama beach
mouse to be defective because of a lack of record evidence that
the offsite habitat acquisition offered as mitigation was (1)
adequately funded, (2) the maximum extent of mitigation
practicable, or (3) consistent with mitigation required for other
projects affecting the beach mouse.86 The court also found that
FWS’s decision not to prepare a full-blown EIS under NEPA
was unsupported because the finding of no significant impact
was made “without any inventory or population data regarding
how many of this declining endangered species exist elsewhere
in the range, and without knowing how many of the species are
being destroyed in the project site.”87
Later, and on a much larger scale, a California district
court held that FWS improperly issued an HCP permit
authorizing development over 53,000 acres in the Natomas
Basin area of northern California.88 The plaintiffs alleged FWS
had inadequately considered factors relevant to the required
determinations regarding the impact of the HCP on the species,
the adequacy of mitigation, and the adequacy of funding.89 The
court found many positive aspects of the plan as a whole, but
82. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv) (2000); see also Jantzen, 760 F.2d at 976.
83. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii); see also Jantzen, 760 F.2d at 976.
84. See supra note 38; see also Jantzen, 760 F.2d at 981-82.
85. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000); Jantzen, 706 F.2d at 981.
86. Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1284-85 (S.D. Ala. 1998).
87. See id. at 1280-83.
88. National Wildlife Fed’n v. Babbitt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1302 (E.D.
Cal. 2000).
89. See id. at 1284-85.
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found flaws in the mechanics and implementation.90 On the
other hand, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that the
plan did not include sufficient data regarding the species and
was not scientifically sound.91 Thus, most of the biological
aspects of the permit were upheld, including the amount of
development allowed and mitigation required, but the
implementation mechanics were deemed inadequate to attain
those biological goals. The lead attorney for the National
Wildlife Federation later proclaimed that “the effect of the
ruling will likely be to produce more rigorous HCPs.” 92
Several other cases have found HCPs lacking on
procedural grounds.93 For example, one court held that FWS
erred in issuing an HCP permit to a housing subdivision
development in the habitat of an endangered squirrel species.94
The agency failed to make certain critical information about
the permit applicant’s mitigation plan adequately available for
The agency also failed to make an
public comment.95
independent finding that the applicant’s plan would minimize
and mitigate harm to the species to the maximum extent
practicable, as required by section 10(a)(1).96 It was not
sufficient for the agency to rely on the applicant’s statements
about the effects of mitigation without making an independent
finding.97
Similarly, another court preliminarily enjoined use of an
HCP permit for a beach condominium development in

90. A critical problem with the permit was that it covered an area
encompassing many local jurisdictions, but the permit as approved included
Sacramento as the only permittee. See id. at 1298-99. FWS improperly
assumed other jurisdictions voluntarily would become permittees. See id. at
1291. Also, the plan did not guarantee funding adequately because the
development fee associated with the permit was inadequate and other
jurisdictions that would need to impose the fee outside of Sacramento were not
included. See id. at 1293-95.
91. See id. at 1291.
92. John Kostyack, NWF v. Babbitt: Victory for Smart Growth and
Imperiled Wildlife, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,712, 10,718 (2001).
93. See, e.g., Gerber v. Norton, 294 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Sierra Club
v. Norton, 207 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (S.D. Ala. 2002).
94. See Gerber, 294 F.3d at 186.
95. See id. at 180-84.
96. See id. at 184-86.
97. FWS later corrected these procedural errors and reissued the permit.
See Notice of Availability of Documents Associated with Winchester Creek
Habitat Conservation Plan, 64 Fed. Reg. 52,609, 52,609-10 (Sept. 4, 2003).
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endangered beach mouse habitat.98 The court found the permit
deficient because FWS did not have sufficient information, or
had not provided a sufficient explanation of the information it
did have, to justify a finding that there would be no significant
impact to the species and thus no EIS would be necessary
under NEPA.99
To be sure, some cases have upheld HCPs in the face of
such challenges. For example, against a barrage of claims that
an HCP permit violated the ESA and NEPA, a court upheld the
permit for commercial development in the range of several
endangered karst-dwelling invertebrate species.100 The judge
observed that “despite my personal lamentation about failing to
nurture nature, my oath and the judicial process require
decisions to be made within the parameters of the law.”101 On
that basis he found, with meticulous documentation from the
record responding to each claim by the plaintiffs, that FWS had
acted within those parameters under both statutes.102
In a more recent decision upholding an HCP for a
development near the Sacramento airport, a court ruled that
the permit issuance requirement that FWS must find the
applicant has mitigated to the “maximum extent practicable”
does not require the permittee to invest as much as it possibly
can afford in mitigation measures such as habitat purchases.103
Rather, endorsing the FWS policy on the question, the
applicant need only mitigate the effects of its incidental take
and “may do something less than fully minimize and mitigate
the impacts of the take where to do more would not be
practicable.”104 The court upheld the permit on all other
grounds, including the adequacy of funding and the
determination that the take would not jeopardize any of the
covered species.105
The won-loss record of the HCP litigation history is not
nearly as important for my purposes as is the fact that there is

98. See Sierra Club, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 1317.
99. See id. at 1331-36.
100. See Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 202
F. Supp. 2d 594, 663 (W.D. Tex. 2002).
101. Id. at 597.
102. See id.
103. See National Wildlife Fed’n v. Norton, 306 F. Supp. 2d 920, 927-28
(E.D. Cal. 2004).
104. See id. at 928.
105. See id. at 926-27.
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a history of aggressive challenges to the program both at the
policy level, such as in the litigation over the No Surprises
Rule,106 and in the applied context, such as with individual
permits. Interest groups fearful of the flexible model of
regulation the HCP program represents can fight it by
nitpicking HCPs to death in the courts, where, notwithstanding
the deferential standard of review required under the
Administrative Procedure Act, judges appear all too willing to
police the program closely. As a consequence, the reward for
agency
willingness
to
experiment
with
adaptive
implementation of the HCP program has been lawsuits and
judicial admonitions, which do nothing to encourage agency
personnel to exhibit “flexibility, openness, and their willingness
to experiment, monitor, and adapt.”107
Not surprisingly, practitioners also have become gloomy
about the HCP program, suggesting its gradual ossification as
litigation claims mount.108 One lawyer active in HCP permit
application processing suggests that the agency’s “response to
the handful of successful HCP challenges has been to fret
endlessly over the documents and records, thus making the
process much more burdensome. . . . The administrative
burdens in doing HCPs are out of hand.”109 The agency, in
other words, has sought refuge in the “front end” of
administrative process, which can only spell doom for any hope
that the adaptive “back end” will flourish. Alas, regulation by
adaptive management, while possible, seems impractical for
agencies to manage in the long run under conventional rules of
administrative law
CONCLUSION—BUILDING A MODEL FOR REGULATION
BY ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT
As any policy response directed at the complex regulatory
problems of the future will require, ecosystem management
requires
adaptive
management
as
its
method
of
implementation.
But truly adaptive management cannot
flourish among regulatory agencies in the conventional
administrative law context. Legislatures, interest groups, and

106. See supra note 77.
107. Grumbine, supra note 20, at 45.
108. See, e.g., Thornton, supra note 51, at 98-101.
109. Email from Alan M. Glen, Partner, Smith, Robertson, Elliott, Glen,
Klein & Bell L.L.P. to author (Mar. 9, 2005) (on file with the author).
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courts have become acculturated to a “front-end” style of
command-and-control regulation that has dominated for
decades and is, to be candid, particularly suited to taking on
discrete, readily-identified vectors of public harm.
Few
observers believe that this model will have lasting success as
problems such as invasive species, sprawl, and terrorism take
hold as the primary transmitters of policy challenges. Why
then should anyone expect the implementation apparatus
associated with command-and-control to be of much use either?
As the National Research Council Committee studying the
Missouri River concluded, adaptive management will “entail
new governance structures.”110
This is not to say that regulation by adaptive management
demands a hands-off, free-wheeling culture of anything goes in
so far as agency decision process is concerned. But public
participation and judicial review can come in many forms, so
adaptive management need not be squeezed into the current
conventions. Some observers suggest, for example, that
adaptive management demands collaborative rather than
confrontational forms of public participation, so as to foster the
continuous
relationships
necessary
for
continuous
adaptation.111 Some are skeptical.112 The fact is we do not yet
know which, if any, constructs of collaboration work to promote
regulation by adaptive management, or whether other means of
public participation we have not thought of are even better
suited. Hence, the challenge for administrative law and policy
is to devise and test new institutions and instruments of policy
implementation that allow agencies to use adaptive
management while ensuring adequate agency accountability.
This effort is a work in process in its early stages. We are
far from ready to draft the National Adaptive Management Act!

110. See MISSOURI RIVER ECOSYSTEM, supra note 14, at 112.
111. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Environmental Lawyering in the Age
of Collaboration, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 555; see also Bradley C. Karkkainen,
Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189 (2002); cf. David L. Markell, “Slack” in the Administrative
State and Its Implications for Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84
See generally Jody Freeman,
OREGON L. REV. 1 (forthcoming 2005).
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1
(1997).
112. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass
Participation for Deliberative Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173 (1997);
Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the
Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411 (2000).
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Yet the central objective for institutional design is quite
apparent: decisionmakers need to be in a position to adjust
decisions based on reliable monitoring feedback. But they must
do so in a manner that is transparent and accountable to the
public, legislatures, and courts and which—here is the kicker—
is subject to some objective boundaries.
The boundaries question poses the more difficult
institutional design problems. By relying more on adaptive
“back-end”
decision
adjustment
processes,
adaptive
management presents two potential sources of concern. One,
which I call “volatility,” is that an agency might alter its initial
decision too substantially too soon after making the initial
decision. A small adjustment made soon after the initial
position is implemented is understandable, but a radical
departure made quickly after the initial position suggests that
the agency’s operational model is faulty, its monitoring is
defective, or something else about the agency’s approach is
fundamentally flawed, and that the agency needs to go back to
the drawing board. The other problem, which I call “drift,” is
the concern that an accumulation of small adjustments over
time may put the agency so far from its initial position that it is
appropriate to demand that the agency pause and conduct a
top-to-bottom review of its objectives, models, monitoring, and
so on.
Volatility and drift present the concerns that require the
construction of objective boundaries the legislature must
express, the public may monitor, and the courts must police.
The boundaries must be defined sharply enough so an agency
will know when it is acting within its adaptive management
mandate and when it has transgressed the mandate and thus
made itself subject to a “front-end” reassessment of its adaptive
management regime. Conceptually, therefore, the following
model of regulation by adaptive management illustrates the
challenge for administrative law reform:
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Boundary of acceptable volatility
Deviation
from initial
agency
position

B
Boundary of acceptable drift

Initial
agency
position

C

A

Time from initial agency position

Defining Boundaries for Volatility and Drift:
The
institutional structure of adaptive management must clearly
define instances of volatility, in which the agency has deviated
from its initial position too dramatically over the short-term
(decision path line A), and instances of drift, in which the
agency has slowly over time moved substantially away from its
initial position (decision path line B), while still protecting the
agency from obtrusive public participation and judicial review
when it has neither acted with too much volatility nor drifted
too far off course (decision path line C).

As this Article has demonstrated, administrative law does
not have much experience with this sort of institutional
structure, one which focuses on what the agency does after
rather than before establishing its initial position. Indeed, the
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conventions of administrative law resist even exploring the
possibilities. It will be essential, therefore, for advocates of
adaptive management to move beyond defining the need for
and basic approach of adaptive management and begin working
directly and aggressively with the institutional design
questions. Regulation by adaptive management is possible,
even inevitable, but hard work lies ahead to make it so.

